Kratzer and Barrett were both attendees at a sexual harassment seminar hosted by their union and employer. Both Kratzer and Barrett had, through separate travel arrangements, arrived the day before the seminar was to begin and both were staying at the same hotel. Kratzer, after a session of steady drinking at a local restaurant, went to Barrett’s hotel room and made several offensive advances to Barrett. Kratzer’s evening long attempt to secure intimate relations included touching Barrett without permission, refusing to let Barrett out of her room and lewd solicitations.
Barrett was unable to attend the seminar sessions the next morning and she reported Kratzer’s actions to a company supervisor. Both employers attended the rest of the seminar without further incident. The employer began investigating Kratzer’s actions and, because of the investigation, Kratzer resigned.
Barrett claimed that the incident caused her serious emotional distress. She began seeing a psychologist and she also resigned from her job. Barrett was later diagnosed as suffering from post traumatic stress disorder. She also claimed to have experienced thoughts of suicide. Barrett filed a claim for damages against Kratzer and State Farm, Kratzer’s homeowner insurer.
State Farm began investigating the claim under a reservation of rights. After discovering the details of the incident, State Farm denied the claim and filed for a declaratory judgment. It requested this judgment, asserting that no bodily injury or accident occurred. Further, their policy excluded intentional acts, therefore they owed neither a defense nor coverage. The lower court agreed and granted their motion. Kratzer and Barrett appealed arguing that, while Kratzer’s actions were intended, the injuries were not, so the claim for damages should be eligible for coverage.
The higher court reviewed the arguments along with the homeowner policy definitions for bodily injury and occurrence. In its opinion, no occurrence took place which would trigger coverage. It also held the position that intentional harm is implicit in the act of sexual harassment. Finally the court also believed that the claim involved “business pursuits” which would have also barred recovery. The lower court’s decision in favor of State Farm was affirmed.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Respondent v. Tuamafa Barrett et al., Appellants. SCCt. No. 3151 Filed April 10, 2000. Affirmed. CCH 2000 Fire and Casualty Cases, Paragraph 6689.
RJC Realty Holding Corporation (RJC) obtained liability coverage for its business, “Pure Maximus Spa/Salon,” from Republic Franklin Insurance Company (Republic). Under the policy, Republic agreed to indemnify and defend RJC against claims for “bodily injury” caused by an “occurrence” as defined in the policy. “Occurrence” was defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” This coverage was subject to two relevant exclusions. Coverage did not apply to ” ‘[b]odily injury’ . . . expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured” or to ” ‘[b]odily injury’ . . . arising out of . . . [b]ody massage other than facial massage.”
employed. Their complaint alleged that there was improper sexual contact during Marie’s massage. When RJC notified Republic of the suit, Republic disclaimed coverage, citing both of the exclusions noted above. RJC sued Republic, seeking a declaratory judgment that it was obligated to defend and indemnify RJC in the Harrison action. The New York Supreme Court (the lower court) ruled in RJC’s favor, stating that neither of the exclusions applied. Republic appealed. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the “expected or intended” exclusion applied. RJC filed a motion for leave to appeal.
In evaluating the case, the Court of Appeals of New York stated, “In deciding whether a loss is the result of an accident, it must be determined, from the point of view of the insured, whether the loss was unexpected, unusual and unforeseen.” In this case, because the insured was the employer of the alleged perpetrator, it was first necessary to decide whether the masseur’s expectation and intention in committing the assault should be attributed to the employer, RJC. The court found the actions were not attributable to RJC. Assuming the allegations were true, the court reasoned that the masseur departed from his duties for solely personal motives unrelated to the furtherance of RJC’s business. Because the actions were not attributable to RJC as an employer, they were not expected or intended by RJC, and were an “accident” within the meaning of the policy.
The court briefly evaluated the question of whether the “bodily injury” arose out of a “body massage” and was excluded. The court read the policy language to include only a bruise or similar injury inflicted on the customer by the massage itself. As a result, the “body massage” exclusion did not apply.
The order of the Appellate Division in favor of Republic was reversed and the Supreme Court judgment in favor of RJC reinstated.
RJC Realty Holding v. Republic Franklin-Court of Appeals of New York-April 1, 2004-808 North Eastern Reporter 2d 1263